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FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION AND § 1983: IS THERE A
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
REMEDIABLE UNDER SECTION 1983?
Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Albright v. Oliver' the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether the claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.2 The plurality concluded that "substantive due process
may not furnish the constitutional peg on which to hang such a
'tort."' 3 Therefore, it rejected petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process claim to be free from prosecution absent
4
probable cause.
This Note examines the development of the federal jurisprudence concerning claims for malicious prosecution under § 1983.
This Note argues that, in Albright, the Court correctly disposed of petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim to be
free from prosecution absent probable cause. However, this Note asserts that procedural due process is also implicated by an arrest and
initiation of a criminal prosecution, and that application of the Fourth
Amendment to a § 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution, while
precluding substantive due process review, should not preclude procedural due process review.5 Ultimately, this Note concludes that alleged constitutional violations as a result of malicious prosecution are
properly analyzed under both the procedural due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the "objective reasonableness" standard of the Fourth Amendment, but not under the "open-ended" Due
1 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994).

2 Id. at 813-14.
3 Id. at 811 n.4.
4 Id. 813-14 (1994).
5 Nevertheless, since petitioner brought only a substantive due process claim, the
Court did not apply procedural due process analysis. Id. at 813-14. Such analysis would be
perilously close to an advisory opinion in violation of the Case or Controversy requirement
of Article III of the Constitution.
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II.

BACKGROUND

42 U.S.C. § 19836 provides a legal remedy for the violation of constitutional rights conferred in other areas of the Constitution.7 Under
the statute, an individual must first uidentify[ ] the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed."8 The Supreme Court has recognized
that the statute was "meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of
constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by an official's abuse
of his position."9 However, the courts have not held that every common-law tort committed by an individual acting "under color of law"' 0
is actionable under § 1983. In the case of malicious prosecution,
there has been an "embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion" as to
whether it is actionable under the section." Until Albright, the Court
had never addressed whether malicious prosecution could be actionable under § 1983.
A.

THE COMMON LAW TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

The common law tort of malicious prosecution generally requires
four elements: (1) the defendant must have initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding must have ended in the plaintiffs favor;
(3) the proceeding must have been initiated without probable cause;
and (4) the defendant must have acted maliciously in the initiation of
the prosecution.' 2 Although the elements of the tort have been
6 The full text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
7 Baker v. McColIan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
8 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
9 Monroe v. Pape, 865 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
10 "In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same
thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v.
Price, 388 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is implicated where an
infringement of federal rights is "'f a irly attributable to the State.'" Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
Therefore, an individual acts "under color of law" if "clothed with the authority of the state
and purporting to act thereunder." Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1974).
11 Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).
12 See, e.g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1988); Usher v. City of LA., 828
F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653.
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clearly established, courts have differed on whether a well-pleaded
complaint based upon malicious prosecution by a government official
"acting under color of law" provides a cause of action under § 1983.18
The debate entails not only whether malicious prosecution itself violates the federal Constitution, but also what particular provision the
tort violates. 14 The federal courts have split almost evenly on the issue
of whether a plaintiff must allege more than the common law tort of
malicious prosecution to state a claim under § 1983.
1.

Allegation of Malicious Prosecution Violates the Constitution: The
Expansive Approach

The most liberal approach taken with respect to an allegation of
malicious prosecution under § 1983 has been clearly articulated by
the Third Circuit, which held that an allegation of the elements of the
common law tort, by itself, states a claim under § 1983 for violation of
a constitutional right.1 5 In Lee v. Mihalich,'6 plaintiffs brought an action against investigators in the Medicaid Fraud Control Office Unit
of the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General alleging abuse of
process and malicious prosecution against them pursuant to a Medicaid fraud suit that was dismissed as time-barred.' 7 While the court
held that the defendants were entitled to a defense based upon qualified immunity,' 8 the court determined that a successful allegation of
13 Indeed, some circuits have reversed their own decisions as to whether malicious prosecution can provide a basis for relief under § 1983. See Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d
1178, 1180-81 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2323 (1992) (noting that the First,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have "flip-flopped" on the constitutional tort status of malicious
prosecution).
14 Of course, the debate over the particular constitutional provision violated is only an
issue for those circuit courts that hold that malicious prosecution, by itself, violates a provision of the Constitution.
15 Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988). Other circuit courts have expressed
this view as well, see Brummett 946 F.2d at 1180-81 n.2 ("Our most recent cases have assumed that malicious prosecution violates section 1983."); NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555,
1563 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11th Cir. 1988) as
citing Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972) for
proposition that "[t] here is a federal right to be free from malicious prosecutions"); Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that abuse of process, of which
malicious prosecution is a subset, by definition denies an individual procedural due process); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961 n.5 (2d Cir. 1988) ("There can be no question that
malicious prosecution can form the basis for imposition of liability under section 1983.").
16 847 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1988).
17 Id. at 67.
18 Id. at 72. The Supreme Court has previously addressed the issue of a government
official's immunity from a § 1983 suit based upon malicious prosecution. See e.g., Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). In Briggs, the Court addressed whether a police officer "who
present[ed] a judge with a complaint and a supporting affidavit which failed to establish
probable cause" is afforded absolute immunity from a malicious prosecution claim. Id. at
337. The Court held that "qualified immunity" is available to the government agent, with
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malicious prosecution against an individual acting under color of law
violates § 1983.19 Nevertheless, the court intimated no view with respect to what provision or provisions of the Constitution the common
20
law malicious prosecution claim violates.
Similarly, other circuits have applied the Lee rationale to an allegation of malicious prosecution against a sheriff and investigating officer pursuant to a grand larceny arrest;2 1 an allegation against police
officers pursuant to a vacated narcotics conviction;2 2 an allegation
against prosecuting attorneys pursuant to an unpaid bank loan;23 and
an allegation against an investigator in the Office of the Attorney Gen24
eral for the State of Alabama pursuant to a forgery indictment. The
expansion of the rationale into these areas indicates that the only requirement for bringing a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983
is an allegation of "action under color of law."2
2. Malicious Prosecution, Without More, Does Not Violate the
Constitution: The "MaliciousProsecutionPlus" Approach
Other circuit courts of appeals, however, have held that an allegation of common law malicious prosecution does not violate a provision of the Constitution unless it is "'intended to subject a person to
denial of constitutional rights.'" 28 These courts recognize that malian "objective reasonableness" standard to be applied to each claim. Id. at 344. Since
Briggs, various circuit courts addressing § 1983 claims have dealt with the issue of
prosecutorial immunity, see, e.g., Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir. 1994); O'Neill v.
Town of Babylon, 986 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1993); Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir.
1992); Fernandez v. Perez, 937 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1991). However, the issue was not before
the Court in Albright v. Oliver, so it is not addressed here.
19 Lee, 847 F.2d at 69-70 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The court held that the claim for
malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires the same elements required for the common
law tort: "(1) the defendant initiate[s] a criminal proceeding; (2) which ends in plaintiff's
favor, (3) [the proceeding] was initiated without probable cause; and (4) the defendant
acts maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the defendant tojustice." Id. (citing
Bell v. Brennan, 570 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (foomotes omitted)).'
20 Lee, 847 F.2d at 69-72. The Court relied onjennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 121920 (3d Cir. 1977) for holding that a claim of malicious prosecution violates § 1983. Jenningsstates that "[a]n abuse of process is by definition a denial of procedural due process."
Id. at 1220. Therefore, while it claimed to intimate no view as to what provision of the
Constitution malicious prosecution violates, its reliance on Jennings indicates the court's
view that malicious prosecution violates an individual's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.
21 Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1989).
22 White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961 n.5 (2d Cir. 1988).
23 Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1180-81 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 2323 (1992).
24 Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11th Cir. 1988).
25 All claims under § 1983 must allege an action by the defendant "under color of law."
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
26 Usher v. City of LA, 828 F.2d 556,562 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773
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cious prosecution may be part of a cognizable § 1983 claim, but "only
if the defendants' conduct also infringes some provision of the Constitution or federal law." 27 Therefore, their decisions require a plaintiff
to allege not only malicious prosecution, but also that the abuse of the
legal process was "so egregious as to subject the aggrieved individual
28
to a deprivation of constitutional dimension."
In Torres v. Superintendent ofPolice of Puerto Rico,29 the First Circuit,
after recognizing the split among the other circuits,3 0 adopted the
standard that to establish liability in a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the defendant "subject[ed] the plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude." 3 1
Specifically, the court held that a complaint based on malicious prosecution must allege a violation of procedural or substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 32 Applying this
standard, the court found that the plaintiffs claim 33 "show[ed]
neither 'conscience-shocking' conduct nor met the requisites of a procedural due process claim." 34 Nevertheless, by analyzing petitioner's
claim under a Fourteenth Amendment rubric, the First Circuit recognized that, at some level, a complaint based upon malicious prosecu35
tion may violate § 1983.
Similarly, applying the standard that a § 1983 claim based upon
malicious prosecution must allege a specific constitutional violation,
the Ninth Circuit held that a complaint alleging "that the defendants
illegally arrested [the plaintiff], submitted false reports and initiated
his criminal prosecution in bad faith" successfully stated a cause of
action under § 1983 because the defendants "intended to deprive a
F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). See alsoKohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th

Cir. 1993) ("[M] alicious prosecution, without more, does not state a claim under 42 U.S.c.
§ 1983."); Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[M]alicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under section 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury."); Torres v. Superintendent of Police of P.L, 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir.
1990) (requiring that misuse of legal proceedings be "egregious" to violate an individual's
constitutional rights); Coogan v. Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Lusby
v. T. G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1431 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818
(1985) ("Malicious prosecution does not automatically constitute a denial of due
process.").
27 Gunderson, 904 F.2d at 409.
28 Coogan, 820 F.2d at 175.
29 893 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1990).
30 Id. at 409.

Id.
Id.
33 Plaintiffs alleged that their dismissal from the San Juan Vice Squad and prosecution
under felony weapons law violations were done maliciously. Id. at 406.
31
32

34 Id. at 410.
35 Id. at 410-11
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person of the equal protection of the laws."36 Therefore, while several
circuit courts of appeals have held that malicious prosecution, itself,
does not state a claim under § 1983,37 all have recognized that, at
some level, "malicious prosecution can form the basis for a section
1983 action."3 8
3. The ConstitutionalProvision Violated
In addition to the split on whether malicious prosecution states a
claim under § 1983, the circuit courts of appeals have differed as to
what provision [s] of the Constitution a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution violates. Section 1983 requires, as a prerequisite to
a claim brought under the constitutional provision, an allegation of
infringement upon a specific constitutional right.39 Applying this requirement to "constitutional tort" cases based upon malicious prosecution, circuit courts of appeals have held that the § 1983 claim can
violate Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, 40 Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights, 4 ' Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights, 42 Fourth Amendment rights incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 43
and a combination of both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 44 This broad disparity between the circuit courts of appeals has
36

Usher v. City of LA, 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987).

37 See supra note 26.
38 See Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1990).

39 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979).
40 Gunderson, 904 F.2d at 409 ("[Plaintiff's] malicious prosecution claim may be taken
to argue a procedural due process violation.") See also Tores v. Superintendent of Police
of P.R., 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[W]e now hold that to state a claim under
Section 1983, the complaint must assert that the malicious conduct was so egregious that it
violated substantive or procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1431 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied/
474 U.S. 818 (1985) (stating that egregious malicious prosecution violates procedures inherent in the Due Process Clause).
41 Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that malicious prosecution can result in incarceration, which is a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the
due process clause). See also Torres, 893 F.2d at 410.
42 Usher v. City of LA, 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that malicious prosecution by defendants must be done "'with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws'") (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
banc)).
43 Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11th Cir. 1988) ("'[A] safeguard so fundamental to criminal due process-one against capricious prosecutions-is... incorporated
by the fourteenth amendment'") (quoting Wheeler v. Cosden Oil & Chem. Co., 734 F.2d
254, 260 (5th. Cir), amended, 744 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1984)).
44 Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[Malicious prosecution]
implicate[s] the constitutional 'guarantees of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.'")
(quoting Thomas v. Kippermann, 846 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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provided little guidance for a plaintiff attempting to allege a constitutional violation based upon § 1983.
4.

The State Tort Remedy

Although all circuit courts of appeals have held that a § 1983
claim based upon malicious prosecution can violate the Constitution,
many circuit courts have nevertheless denied relief for a plaintiff
"where state law affords an adequate remedy."45 Stating the rationale
for this limitation on recovery under § 1983, the Seventh Circuit
noted that "[t]he multiplication of remedies for identical wrongs,
while gratifying for plaintiffs and their lawyers, is not always in the best
interest of the legal system or the nation."4 6 Furthermore, this limitation has been applied pursuant to past Supreme Court decisions holding that an adequate state postdeprivation remedy denies relief under
§ 1983. 4 7
In Parrattv. Taylor,48 the Court held that unauthorized conduct
by state officials resulting in a loss of property did not constitute a
denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment where there was an adequate state remedy available. 49 Relying
upon this holding, the First Circuit has held that "the availability of an
adequate remedy for malicious prosecution under [state] law ... is
50
fatal to [a § 1983] claim."
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March of 1987, Veda Moore approached City of Macomb, Illinois Police Detective Roger Oliver and other police detectives seeking
police "protection" from an individual she claimed was threatening
her for cocaine debts. 5 1 At the time of this request, Moore had recently completed a thirty day stay in a narcotics treatment center for
52
cocaine addiction.
Detective Oliver allegedly agreed to provide Moore with police
45 Torres, 898 F.2d at 411.
46 Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, there is an incentive to file a claim under § 1983 even if an adequate state remedy is available because "[iln
any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ... the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
47 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531-36 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 535-44 (1981).
48 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
49 Id. at 541-43.

50 Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
51 Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 823 nn.3, 5 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52 Brief for Respondent at 6, Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994) (No. 92-833).
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protection if she would act as an informant against narcotics dealers
in the Macomb area. 53 Specifically, under the agreement with the police, Moore would first identify potential narcotics dealers without direction from Detective Oliver and then purchase narcotics from those
dealers with money provided to her from the Macomb Police Department through Detective Oliver.54 In addition, Detective Oliver paid
Moore between fifty and seventy-five dollars for each purchase of a
55
controlled substance that she reported.
- Throughout the spring and summer of 1987, Moore represented
to Detective Oliver that she had purchased controlled substances pursuant to this arrangement from over fifty separate individuals. 56 On
17July 1987, Moore delivered a substance that appeared to be cocaine
to Detective Oliver and reported that she had purchased the substance from John Albright,Jr. in a room at the Pace Hotel in Macomb,
Illinois. 5 7 Detective Oliver submitted the substance to the police laboratory for testing.58 On 2 September 1987, the laboratory concluded
59
that the substance was actually baking powder.
On 10 September 1987, Detective Oliver related Moore's version
60
of the Pace Hotel transaction to a McDonough County Grand Jury.
The grand jury returned an indictment for the sale of a "look-alike
substance," and the Circuit Court of McDonough County issued an
61
arrest warrant for John Albright, Jr.

Detective Oliver went to the home of John Albright, Jr. on 28
September 1987 to execute the arrest warrant.6 2 After being informed by Mr. Albright's wife that her husband was a sixty-year-old
retired registered pharmacist, 63 and that they had two sons named Kevin and John David Albright, 64 Detective Oliver realized that Mr. Albright may not be the person from whom Moore had allegedly
65
purchased the "look-alike substance."
Based on this information, Detective Oliver scratched John Albright, Jr.'s name from the arrest warrant and inserted the name of
John David Albright, presuming that he must be the individual Moore
53 Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 823 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

54 Respondent's Brief at 6, Afhright (No. 92-833).
55 Id.

56 Brief for Petitioner at 8, Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994) (No. 92-833).
57 Id.

58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Respondent's Brief at 6, Alhright (No. 92-833).
61 Albright v. Oliver, 114 S.Ct. 807, 823 n.4 (1994) (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
62 Respondent's Brief at 6, Afbright (No. 92-833).
63 Albigh, 114 S. Ct. at 810 n.1.
64 Petitioner's Brief at 8, Aibright (No. 92-833).

65 Id.
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had implicated. 66 Upon learning of the warrant for his arrest, John
David Albright, who had been living and working in Chicago, Illinois
since September, 1986, returned to Macomb. 67 On 1 October 1987,
John David Albright met with Detective Oliver at the police station
and informed him that he was not in Macomb on 17 July 1987, the
date Moore allegedly purchased the substance in question. 68
With John David Albright still present at the police station, Detective Oliver telephoned Moore and informed her that neitherJohn Albright, Jr. nor his son, John David Albright, could have been the
individual from whom she had allegedly purchased the "look-alike
substance" at the Pace Hotel on the night of July 17.69 He inquired
whether the individual could have been John Albright, Jr.'s other son,
Kevin Albright.70 In response, Moore confirmed that Kevin Albright
7
was the man from whom she had made the purchase. '
On 16 October 1987, Detective Oliver attested to a criminal information charging that Kevin Albright had sold a "look-alike substance"
73
to Moore on 17July 1987.72 Following the issue of an arrest warrant,
Kevin Albright surrendered to Detective Oliver on 19 October 1987,
but denied any involvement in the alleged crime. 74
Detective Oliver arrested Kevin Albright and the judge set bond
at $3500. 75 Mr. Albright paid the ten percent bond ($350) required
by Illinois law and was released.7 6 As a condition of his bond, Kevin
Albright was prohibited from leaving the state of Illinois without leave
77

of court.

On 5 January 1988, Detective Oliver testified at a preliminary
hearing that Kevin Albright sold the "look-alike substance" to Moore
on 17July 1987.78 At this hearing, Detective Oliver failed to advise the
court of various circumstances surrounding Kevin Albright's arrest, including: Moore's prior history; Detective Oliver's previous testimony
to the Grand Jury; and the various arrest warrants issued pursuant to
the alleged July 17 sale.79 Regardless of this failure, the court found
66
67
68
69
70
7'
72
73
74

Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 823 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 810.
Respondent's Brief at 8-9, A/bright (No. 92-83).
Id.
Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 810 n.1.
Id.
Petitioner's Brief at 9, Albright (No. 92-833).
Id.
Respondent's Brief at 7, Aibright (No. 92-833).

75 Id.
76 Albright
77 Id.

v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 810 (1994).

78 Id.
79 Petitioner's Brief at 11-12, Aibright (No. 92-838).
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probable cause for Kevin Albright to stand trial 8 0
On 27 June 1988, the court dismissed the criminal action on the
basis that it did not state an offense under Illinois law.81 Almost two
years to the day after the dismissal of the charges against Kevin Albright, he filed a claim in federal district court against Detective Oliver and the city of Macomb, Illinois pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that his "liberty" interest to be free from criminal prosecution
absent probable cause had been violated.8 2 The district court, in an
unreported opinion, granted respondent's motion to dismiss on the
theory that the complaint did not state a claim under § 1983.83 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this decision while
concluding that petitioner filed his suit as malicious prosecution be84
cause the statute of limitations had passed for his false arrest claim.
Although the court acknowledged that malicious prosecution can be a
component of a constitutional tort, it held that prosecution without
probable cause could only be actionable under § 1983 when accompanied by incarceration, loss of employment, or other "palpable consequence."8 5 Furthermore, the court rejected petitioner's argument
that his "confinement" to Illinois deprived him of his constitutional
"liberty," noting that Detective Oliver's testimony at the preliminary
hearing was not intended to curtail petitioner's right to travel. 8 6 Finally, the court of appeals rejected petitioner's argument that he was
denied the equal protection of the laws because the state's arbitrary
act of selecting petitioner for prosecution did not create a "class" for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. 87 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari 88 on the issue of whether the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment could provide a basis for petitioner's
§ 1983 claim. 89
80 A/bright, 114 S. Ct. at 810.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 810-11.
83 Id. at 811.

The court "also held that Detective Oliver was entitled to a defense of qualified immunity, and that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability against the city of Macomb. The District Court also dismissed without prejudice
the common-law claim of malicious prosecution against Detective Oliver. These issues
are not before this Court."
Id. at 811 n.3.
84 Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).
85 Id. at 34647.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 348.
88 Albright v. Oliver, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993).
89 Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 810 (1994).
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SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided an individual the right to be free from criminal prosecution without probable
cause. 90 In a seven-two decision, the four Justice plurality held that
petitioner's claim could not be maintained under the Due Process
Clause and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to dismiss petitioner's claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. 91
A.

PLURALITY OPINION

In an opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the plurality92 held that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "substantive due process, with its 'scarce and open-ended guideposts'"
could not provide a basis for petitioner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.9 3
The plurality, acknowledging its reluctance to expand the concept of
substantive due process, maintained that it must analyze petitioner's
claim under the Fourth Amendment, because the Framers intended
94
the Fourth Amendment to cover pretrial deprivations of liberty.
Since the petitioner did not present the Fourth Amendment issue in
his petition for certiorari, the plurality dismissed petitioner's claim
without expressing an opinion as to whether petitioner would succeed
under the Fourth Amendment. 95
The plurality began its analysis of petitioner's claim by declaring
that to succeed in a § 1983 claim, the petitioner must first identify the
specific constitutional provision allegedly infringed by the State. 96 Applying this requirement to petitioner's claim, the plurality maintained
that petitioner's action alleged that respondent infringed his "substantive due process right to be free of prosecution without probable
cause."9 7 The plurality noted that petitioner Albright did not allege
that Illinois denied him procedural due process, or violated his
Fourth Amendment Rights, despite the plurality's recognition that
"his surrender to the State's show of authority constituted a seizure for
90 Albright, 113 S. Ct. at 1382.

91 A/bright, 114 S. Ct. at 814.
92 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ginsburgjoined ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion.
93 Afbright, 114 S. Ct. at 813-14 (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068
(1992)).
94 Id. at 813.

95 Id. at 813-14.
96 Id. at 811.
97 Id. at 812.
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the purposes of the Fourth Amendment."9 8 Analyzing petitioner's
claim in this rubric, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that petitioner's claim to be free from criminal prosecution absent probable
cause was "markedly different" from the Court's past protections of
substantive due process, which have mostly related to "marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity."9 9 The plurality
stated that "'[a]s a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are
scarce and open-ended.'"1 0 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist then rejected petitioner's reliance upon
prior Supreme Court cases that recognized the Fourteenth Amendment confers both substantive and procedural rights as the basis for a
§ 1983 claim. 10 1 While conceding that the Due Process Clause protects substantive rights intended to secure individuals from the arbitrary exercise of government power, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that the Constitution demanded more inquiry in a criminal prosecution than simply whether, in the Court's view, "the governmental ac02
tion in question was 'arbitrary.'' 1
Having rejected the simple application of an "arbitrary" test, the
plurality then proceeded to analyze the history of the Due Process
03
Clause to discern the appropriate test to apply to petitioner's claim.'
Although the Supreme Court was reluctant to apply the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to the States in the late nineteenth century,104 it has since held that a number of the procedural protections
contained in the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 5 As a result, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the course of decision has "substituted...
the specific guarantees of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights
embodied in the first [Ten] Amendments to the Constitution for the
more generalized language contained in the earlier cases construing
the Fourteenth Amendment "10 6 Based upon this historical analysis,
the plurality announced its refusal to analyze a claim under the
98 Id.
99 Id.
100

Id. at 812 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992)).

101 Id. (noting petitioner's reliance on United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)

and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 831 (1986)).
102 Id.

Id. at 812-18.
Id. at 812. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), "did not make applicable to
the States the Fifth Amendment's requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime
be instituted by the indictment of a grandjury." Afhright, 114 S. Ct. at 812.
105 Id. at 812-13.
103
104

106 Id. at 813.
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"'more generalized notion of 'substantive due process'... '[w]here a
particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection. '"107
Applying this test to petitioner's claim, the plurality determined
that the Framers intended pretrial deprivations of liberty to be adjudicated under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 8 It noted that the Fourth Amendment relates to "deprivations
of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions." 10 9 Therefore, the plurality held that petitioner's claim came under the Fourth
Amendment, not under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 110
Finally, since petitioner did not present the Fourth Amendment
question in his petition for certiorari, the plurality affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissing petitioner's claim."'
B.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE

In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality's dismissal of petitioner's claim and argued that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could not supplement specific
112
textual provisions of the Constitution.
Justice Scalia asserted that while there may be many different
abuses of the trial process, petitioner's "deprivation of life, liberty, or
u 3 He then mainproperty, if any, consisted of [his] pretrial arrest.""
tained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees merely that certain procedures are followed as a prerequisite to a deprivation of liberty. 114 While he recognized that the
Court's current jurisprudence acknowledges substantive due process
within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, he argued
that "it cannot be used to impose additional requirements upon such
of the states' criminal processes as are already addressed... by the Bill
of Rights." 115 Since the Bill of Rights contains procedural guarantees
within the Fifth and Sixth Amendments governing the period before
107 Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).

Id.
Id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any
extended restraint on liberty following an arrest")).
108
109

110 Id. at 813-14.
11 Id. at 813.
112 Id. at 814 (Scalia, J., concurring).

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
114 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
115 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
113
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and during trial, Justice Scalia concluded that those requirements
could not be supplemented through utilization of the device the
1 16
Court has referred to as "substantive due process."
C.

JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Ginsburg agreed with the plurality that petitioner's claim
is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, but, unlike the
plurality, proceeded to perform that analysis.' 1 7 After speculating as
to why petitioner pressed a Fourteenth Amendment argument to the
Court and not one based on the Fourth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg
ultimately concluded that petitioner had a valid § 1983 claim based
upon violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, but found that his
failure to assert this claim to the Court barred any relief." 8
Initially, Justice Ginsburg stated that petitioner's "submission to
arrest unquestionably constituted a [Fourth Amendment] seizure.""i 9
However, after acknowledging that petitioner advanced only a Fourteenth Amendment "substantive due process right to be free from
prosecution without probable cause," Justice Ginsburg speculated that
petitioner's "strategic decision appear[ed] to have been predicated on
two doubtful assumptions, the first relating to the compass of the
Fourth Amendment, the second, to the time for commencing this civil
action."120

First, Justice Ginsburg argued that petitioner may have anticipated a holding limiting his "seizure" to the period from his surrender
until he was released on bond, and thus Detective Oliver's allegedly
misleading testimony could not be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. 12 1 Responding to this concern, Justice Ginsburg asserted that
the common-law meaning of the Amendment's term "seizure" held it
"to continue even after release from official custody."122 Since the
common law purpose of an arrest was to ensure an appearance in
court, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the distinction between pretrial incarceration and bail is a "distinction between methods of retaining control over a defendant's person, not one between seizure
and its opposite." 123 Thus, according to Justice Ginsburg, petitioner
was "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment despite his reId. (Scalia, J., concurring).
117 Id. at 814-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also id. at 813 (plurality declines to address petitioner's claim under the Fourth Amendment).
118 Id. at 814-17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 815 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
121 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
122 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
123 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
116
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lease on bail. 124
Justice Ginsburg then buttressed her argument that petitioner
was "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment with an argument based upon "common sense and common understanding."1 25
When facing criminal charges, a person must appear in court at the
state's command, is often restricted from travelling outside the state
without leave of court, and must prepare a defense at great financial
and emotional expense.126 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that an alleged wrongdoer incarcerated until trial undoubtably suffers greater
burdens, but argued that the difference "should not lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pretrial is not still 'seized' in the
constitutionally relevant sense." 12 7 Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted
that Detective Oliver's allegedly misleading testimony at the preliminary hearing perpetuated the state's "seizure" of petitioner. 12
After concluding that petitioner was "seized" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg addressed whether the statute
of limitations would have barred petitioner's Fourth Amendment
claim. 129 She asserted that the statute of limitations should have accrued upon the dismissal of the lawsuit against petitioner, not at the
date of his arrest, as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested in dictum.'5 0 Because petitioner remained "seized" until dismissal of the charges against him, his cause of action accrued at the
end of the criminal proceedings, rather than at the time of his
arrest.131 As a result, she concluded that petitioner could have as132
serted a Fourth Amendment claim within the statute of limitations.
Finally, although petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim was
"neither substantively deficient nor inevitably time-barred," 13 Justice
Ginsburg concluded that petitioner's abandonment of the claim in
the district court and failure to reassert it in front of the Supreme
Court barred the Court from asserting it for him.' a4 Thus, she concurred with the plurality decision dismissing petitioner's complaint. 135
124
125

Id. at 815-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

126 Id. at 815 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In addition, while criminal prosecution is
pending, a criminal defendant may suffer reputational harm and experience severely diminished employment prospects. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 815-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
129 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
130 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
131 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
132 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
133 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 816-17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
135 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Kennedy 36 also agreed with the plurality that "an allegation of arrest without probable cause must be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment." 3 7 However, he wrote separately to explain that
petitioner's due process claim arose not out of his arrest by Detective
Oliver, but out of an allegedly malicious criminal prosecution against
him.' 38 Therefore, Justice Kennedy analyzed the criminal proceedings, not the arrest, under the Due Process Clause, and ultimately concluded that the existence of a state tort remedy in Illinois for
malicious prosecution disposed of petitioner's claim.' 3 9
The threshold question forJustice Kennedy was "whether the due
process requirements for criminal proceedings include a standard for
the initiation of a prosecution." 140 Justice Kennedy argued that the
Bill of Rights imposes no standard for the initiation of a prosecution,
nor does it require a pretrial hearing. 14 ' While he conceded that a
criminal procedure may violate the Due Process Clause even if it does
not violate a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, he argued that
while the "common law provided for a grand jury indictment and a
speedy trial[,] it did not provide a specific evidentiary standard applicable to a pretrial hearing on the merits of the charges." 142 Since the
Bill of Rights guarantees these traditional requirements of the criminal process, any standard that governed the initiation of a criminal
proceeding would be superfluous to the Constitutional protections
governing the criminal process. 43
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the due process
inquiry does not end there.'4 For purposes of petitioner's claim, he
assumed arguendo that the Due Process Clause protected petitioner's
interest in freedom from malicious prosecution. 4 5 Still, he argued
that prior precedent clearly denied recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for "a state actor's random and unauthorized deprivation of that interest[,] ... [as] long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation
remedy."146
136 Justice Thomas joined injustice Kennedy's opinion.
137 Affright, 114 S. Ct. at 817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

138 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Id. at 817-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'43 Id. at 818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
144 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'45 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139
140
141
14
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Justice Kennedy relied on Parrattv. Taylnr47 for the proposition
that federal courts are often not the correct venue to litigate many
common law claims, "even when a state actor is the alleged wrongdoer."' 48 Without this limitation, he contended, the Fourteenth
Amendment could be the vehicle by which any "'alleged injury which
may have been inflicted by a state official acting under color of law'"
could be litigated under § 1983.149 He concluded that, given the
precedential force of Parratt,plaintiffs cannot litigate claims under
§ 1983 arising from the random and unauthorized act of a state actor
that can be remedied at state law.' 50 Applying this rule to petitioner's
case, Justice Kennedy disposed of petitioner's claim by noting that Illinois provided an adequate tort remedy for malicious prosecution. 151
The fact that petitioner brought the claim after the statute of limitations for malicious prosecution had expired did not alter the adequacy of the Parrattrule.' 52
Finally, Justice Kennedy recognized that lack of an adequate state
tort remedy would buttress a claim for violation of the Due Process
Clause enforceable under § 1983.153 However, since that question was
not before the Court and Illinois provided an adequate state tort remedy, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment holding that peti54
tioner's claim be dismissed.'
E.

JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Souter began his opinion by acknowledging his agreement
with the Court's dismissal of petitioner's claim, while announcing his
disagreement with the plurality's reasoning. 155 He contended that the
Fourth Amendment should not preempt analysis of petitioner's claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 56 However, under the Fourteenth Amendment, he asserted that petitioner's failure to allege an
injury resulting solely from the alleged malicious prosecution against
him required the court to exercise judicial self-restraint by not expanding the limits of the Due Process Clause to encompass peti147

451 U.S. 527 (1981).

148 Albright 114 S. Ct. at 818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Parfat, 451 U.S. at 544). As an example,

Justice Kennedy stated that even a party who is simply involved in an automobile accident
with a state official could allege a violation under § 1983. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151 Id. at 819 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155 Id. at 819-20 (Souter, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 820 (Souter, J., concurring).
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tioner's claim. 157 Therefore, he concurred in the judgment of the
plurality.15 8

Justice Souter first argued that the Court had previously rejected
the proposition that a specific constitutional provision can preempt
the application of a more general one and denied that "incorporation
of the substantive guarantees of the first eight amendments to the
Constitution defines the [outer] limits of due process protection." 59
Nevertheless, Justice Souter felt that the Court had to exercise judicial
self-restraint when asked to expand the protections of substantive due
process, and contended that the Fourteenth Amendment should not
be used to duplicate protections adequately addressed by other consti60
tutional provisions.
Applying judicial self-restraint to petitioner's claim, Justice Souter
declared that it failed to allege any injury which resulted from the
initiation of a baseless prosecution against petitioner that did not also
result from his seizure by the State, correctly analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment. 16 ' As such, "[n]one of these injuries . . .is alleged to have followed from the issuance of the formal instrument of
62
prosecution, as distinct from the ensuing assertion of custody."'
Therefore, he concluded, the petitioner failed to show a substantive
deprivation of liberty attributable to the initiation of the
63
prosecution.'
The significance of petitioner's failure, Justice Souter asserted,
lies in the courts of appeals' recognition that injuries similar to petitioner's have provided a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the
Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause, not the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. x64 Since damages to reputation,
limitation on movement, burden of defending, and other attendant
harms tend to occur after arrest, Justice Souter concluded "it is not
surprising that rules of recovery for such harms have naturally coa65
lesced under the Fourth Amendment."
Finally, Justice Souter recognized the potential for an injury to
occur during the interim period between the filing of a groundless
criminal charge and a Fourth Amendment seizure, but remarked that
Id. at 820-22 (SouterJ., concurring).
Id. at 819-20 (SouterJ., concurring).
159 Id. at 820 (Souter,J., concurring) (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89-92
(1947) (BlackJ, dissenting)).
160 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
161 Id. at 821 (Souter, J., concurring).
162 Id. (Souter,J., concurring).
163 Id. (Souter,J., concurring).
164 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 821-22 (SouterJ., concurring).
157
158
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this was not petitioner's claim.' 6 6 Therefore,Justice Souter concluded
that the Court should exercise judicial self-restraint and concurred in
1 67
the plurality's opinion dismissing petitioner's claim.
F.

JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT

Justice Stevens1 68 presented the issue in petitioner's claim as
whether the Fourteenth Amendment provides a constraint on state
government's power to accuse an individual of a crime comparable to
the Fifth Amendment's constraint on the federal government. 16 9 As
Justice Stevens points out, the Fifth Amendment requires a grand jury
determination that there is probable cause to support the federal government's accusation.' 70 Justice Stevens argued that states are also required to adequately protect the probable cause requirement for
initiation of a criminal prosecution.171 Applying the facts of petitioner's claim, he contended that the state did not satisfy the probable
cause requirement in this case. 1 72 Next, he asserted that the state's
failure to meet the probable cause requirement violated petitioner's
"liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment and that "compliance
with certain procedural formalities which ordinarily ensure that a
prosecution will not commence absent probable cause" does not meet
the demands of the Due Process Clause.'73 Therefore, he dissented
from the decision of the plurality dismissing petitioner's claim.174
Initially, Justice Stevens declared that Hurtado v. Califomia,175
while not requiring states to initiate a prosecution by grand jury indictment, mandates that states adequately protect the probable cause
requirement for initiation of a criminal prosecution. 17 6 After factually
analyzing petitioner's claim, he concluded that the probable cause re177
quirement was not satisfied in this case.
Following this factual analysis, Justice Stevens declared that the
Due Process Clause is unquestionably implicated where an individual
is convicted and incarcerated, 78 but "extend[s] well beyond freedom
166 Id. at 822 (Souter, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 820-22 (Souter, J., concurring).
168 Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens' opinion.
169 Albright 114 S. Ct. at 822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

170 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 823-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'74 Id. at 832 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
176 Albrigh, 114 S. Ct. at 822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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from an improper criminal conviction." 179 He noted that the parameters of the Due Process Clause have never been fully defined, and that
formal commencement of a criminal proceeding violates "a range of
identified liberty interests ... of sufficient magnitude to qualify as a
deprivation of liberty meriting constitutional protection" by the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 0 Therefore, he concluded, the Court should
have continued its analysis to determine "what measure of 'due process' must be provided an accused in connection with this deprivation
8
of liberty."' '
Justice Stevens relied on various precedents to discern that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands a responsible decision whether there is probable cause to prosecute an
individual for a criminal violation. 18 2 Analyzing this requirement of
"probable cause to prosecute," he rejected an approach where "a
state's compliance with facially valid procedures for initiating a prosecution [would be] by itself sufficient to meet the demands of due process, without regard to the substance of the resulting probable cause
determination."1 8 3 He argued that it is "well established that adherence to procedural forms will not save a conviction that rests in substance on false evidence or deliberate deception."1 8 4 Analogizing the
initiation of a criminal prosecution to such a conviction, he concluded that compliance with facially valid procedures for the initiation
of a prosecution would not, by itself, meet the demands of the Due
Process Clause. 1'
Finally, Justice Stevens commented upon the various opinions
that supported the Court's judgment. 186 Beginning with the plurality
opinion, he identified two "glaring flaws."1 8 7 First, he asserted that
petitioner's pretrial deprivation of liberty is addressed specifically by
the Fifth, not the Fourth, Amendment. 188 While acknowledging that
this is of lesser importance, he contended that "the cramped view of
the Fourteenth Amendment taken by the plurality today has been rejected time and time again by the Court." 189 He argued that the Due
Process Clause recognizes liberty interests not "limited to the realm
179 Id. at 824 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 824-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 826-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 827-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
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outside [of the] criminal law." 190 Second, Justice Stevens maintained
that the plurality virtually ignored the principle that "'the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 19 1 Relying on this assertion, he faulted the
plurality for attempting to limit the Due Process Clause by the specific
192
guarantees within the Bill of Rights.
Justice Stevens began his comments on justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion by acknowledging his agreement with her contention
that petitioner could have alleged a cause of action under § 1983
based on the Fourth Amendment. 93 However, he asserted that petitioner's "abandonment of a claim based on the seizure should [not]
constitute a waiver of the claim based on the [allegedly malicious]
accusation,"1 9 4 because the Fourth Amendment protection "does not
fully encompass the liberty interest that is at stake."' 9 5 Therefore, he
concluded that Justice Ginsburg's opinion does not adequately explain her conclusion that the complaint should be dismissed.' 9 6
Justice Stevens next faulted Justice Souter's concurrence for
wrongly characterizing petitioner's claim "as an invitation to enter uncharted territory" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 7 Citing various precedents, he concluded that the claim is "manifestly of
constitutional dimension." 198
Justice Stevens also argued that Justice Kennedy's concurrence
incorrectly relied upon Parratt v. Taylor' 9 9 to dispose of petitioner's
claim.2 00 He contended that the Parrattrule was inapplicable to this
case, because it "is limited to situations in which no constitutional violation occurs." 2 01 Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that in cases
such as petitioner's, in which there is an alleged constitutional violation, § 1983 provides a federal remedy regardless of the presence of
20 2
an adequate state remedy.
Finally, Justice Stevens' opinion noted that none of the five opinions supporting the judgment of affirmance "endorses the reasoning
190 Id. at 829 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
192 Id. at 830 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Note, however, thatJustice Ginsburg acknowledged peti-

tioner's failure to raise the Fourth Amendment issue. Id. at 815 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
194 Id. at 831 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 832 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 830 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 832 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199 451 U.S. 527 (1981).

200 Alhright, 114 S.Ct. at 833 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 834 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 835 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of the Court of Appeals, and none of them commands a majority."2 0 3
Adding that none of the opinions rejected his contention that "the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains the
power of state governments to accuse a citizen of an infamous crime,"
204
Justice Stevens dissented.
V. ANALYSIS
In Albright v. Oliver, the United States Supreme Court correctly
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
dismissing petitioner's claim.2 0 5 By holding that a potential § 1983
claim based upon the State's arrest and alleged initiation of a malicious prosecution must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment,
not the Fourteenth Amendment,2 0 6 the Court discourages plaintiff's
from "aim[ing] in the general direction of the federal Constitution
with buckshot."20 7 The Court set a standard that future potential
plaintiffs allege a specific constitutional violation as a prerequisite to a
§ 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution, rather than rely on
the "'more generalized notion of substantive due process"' as the basis for their claim.2 08 However, by declining to analyze petitioner's
claim under the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not resolve the
split of opinion among the circuit courts as to whether the tort of
malicious prosecution may provide a basis for relief under § 1983.209
Thus, the only guidance for the lower federal courts lies in Justice
2 10
Ginsburg's concurrence.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VERSUS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
WHICH PROVISION GOVERNS?

The plurality in Albright was faced with a very specific claim
203

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

204 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 810 (dismissing petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment claim).
206 Id. at 818-14. SeeWolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). "[The Fourth Amend-

ment] is... implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause." Id.
207 Chiplin Enters. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d. 1524, 1526 (1st Cir. 1983).
208 A/hright 114 S. Ct. at 813 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
209 SeeBrummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1180-81 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 2323 (1992) (cataloging the divergence of approaches taken by the courts of
appeals).
210 A/hrigh, 114 S. Ct. at 814-817 (1994) (Ginsburg,J., concurring). However, the failure
of the Court to address petitioner's claim under the Fourth Amendment was the result of
petitioner's failure to raise the issue in petition for certiorari. The plurality correctly declined to analyze the Fourth Amendment issue, for such analysis would arguably violate the
Case or Controversy requirement of Article M of the Constitution. Justice Ginsburg, noting petitioner's failure to raise the issue, was the onlyjustice to address petitioner's claim
under the Fourth Amendment.
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brought in the petition for certiorari: whether a groundless criminal
prosecution violates a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process liberty right to be free from criminal prosecution absent probable
cause.2 1 1 Although there has been a split among the circuit courts of
appeals as to what provision of the Constitution a § 1983 claim based
upon malicious prosecution violates,2 1 2 petitioner specifically
presented only a substantive due process claim in his petition for certiorari.2 1 3 Applying a substantive due process analysis, the Court correctly concluded that petitioner's specific claim of a pretrial
deprivation of liberty could not rest upon a liberty interest derived
from the Court's protections under substantive due process, because
the specific constitutional protections within the Fourth Amendment
and procedural due process preclude the Court from articulating
such a liberty right.
However, the Court has also stated that "[n]either the Bill of
Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substan214
tive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects."
Despite this, the Court has consistently recognized a general reluctance to expand the notions of substantive due process analysis.2 1 5
The Court has previously found substantive rights pertaining to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education."2 1 6 None of these cases, however, presented issues
pertaining to an alleged abuse of the legal process, such as the tort of
malicious prosecution. Cases involving abuse of the legal process have
typically been adjudicated pursuant to "the procedural protections
contained in the Bill of Rights ...made applicable to the states by the

Fourteenth Amendment,"2 1 7 not under substantive due process.2 1 8
In Hurtado v. California,2 19 an early case applying the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause to an alleged abuse of the legal process, the Court held that the words 'due process of law' in the Four211 Petitioner's Brief at 8, Albright (No. 92-833).

212 See supra notes 40 to 44 and accompanying text (noting the difference of opinion
among the Circuit Courts).
213 Albright, 114 S. CL at 812.
214 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992).
215 Collins v. Harker Heights, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992). "As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and openended." Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985)).
216 Casey, 112 S. CL at 2807.
217 Albright 114 S.Ct. at 812.
218 Id. at 812-13 (listing cases that have applied specific procedural protections within
the Bill of Rights to the States).
219 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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teenth Amendment did not require the States to initiate a prosecution
by grand jury indictment, but only required that the States enactjudicial proceedings to "preserve[ ] . . . principles of liberty and justice." 220 Therefore, the Court in Hurtado did not create a substantive
right to be free from state prosecution absent a grand jury indictment.2 21 Rather, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not require the states to follow certain procedures mandated by the
Fifth Amendment for federal criminal prosecutions. 222 Therefore,
when applying the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to
the states, the Court initially held that there was no substantive right to
be free from the state's deprivation of life, liberty, or property, but
only that certain proceduresbe followed in a deprivation of an individual's life, liberty, or property by the State. 223 The Court has stated
that "Itlhis requirement of the Constitution is met if the2 24trial is had
according to the settled course of judicial proceedings."
Since Hurtado, the Court has had the opportunity to refine the
procedures constitutionally due a potential defendant under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Consistently applying specific provisions of
the Bill of Rights pertaining to criminal proceedings to the States, the
Court has declined to recognize broad substantive due process rights
within the context of those proceedings. 22 5 Given the past application
of these processes to the States, the plurality was correct to conclude
that " [ w]here a particular amendment 'provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these
claims."' 2 26 To conclude otherwise would subject every procedural
safeguard within the Bill of Rights to substantive review. This would
transform the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause into an "allencompassing" provision, and subject each and every procedural protection within the Bill of Rights to substantive due process review,
2 27
hardly the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
220 Id. at 537. Hurtadospecifically held that the Fifth Amendment's requirement of indictment by grand jury was not applicable to the States. Id. at 534-35.
221 Id. at 534-38.

222

Id.

Id. at 533.
Id. (quoting Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1875)).
See Alright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct 807, 812-13 (1994). This process has generally been
referred to as "incorporation" of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
226 Id. at 813 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
227 See, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE LJ.1193;
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or immunities Claus 101 YALE LJ. 1385 (1992).
Both articles agree that, at a minimum, the Fourteenth Amendment was passed to constitu223
224
225
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Moreover, it would render the procedural safeguards within the Bill of
Rights superfluous, as each provision would ultimately be evaluated
under substantive due process review.
Most recently, the Court has required constitutional claims to be
adjudicated under a specific constitutional provision rather than
under the "more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,'" if
such a provision is applicable.2 28 This jurisprudence coincides with
the Court's reluctance to expand the notions of substantive due process. 22 9 Therefore, if the Fourth Amendment governs petitioner's

claim, the plurality correctly dismissed petitioner's substantive due
23 0
process claim.
While the plurality properly held that the Framers intended the
Fourth Amendment to govern pretrial deprivations of liberty such as
petitioner alleged, 23 1 the more difficult question the Court faced was
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a § 1983 claim predicated
on an abuse of process. 23 2 If it does, then the Court's precedent pre23 3
cludes a substantive due process review.
Nevertheless, the plurality was not without guidance when analyzing petitioner's claim. In Graham v. Connor,2 34 the Court refused to
analyze a claim to be free from excessive force under substantive due
process " [b] ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this... governmental
conduct." 235 Although Grahamapplied specifically to the use of excessive force during a seizure, 236 the analysis is applicable to petitioner's
of
claim as well, because the Framers intended pretrial deprivations
2 37
liberty to be adjudicated under the Fourth Amendment.
Nevertheless, while the plurality correctly concluded that the
Fourth Amendment precluded substantive due process review of petitioner's claim, the plurality's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment
tionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866, not to subject every claim against the government to
substantive due process review.
228 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
229 See Collins v. Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992).
230 Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813-14 (concluding that petitioner's claim should be addressed
under the Fourth Amendment).
231 Id. at 813.
232 See supra notes 40 to 44 and accompanying text (listing the disagreement among
Circuit Courts as to what provision of the Constitution malicious prosecution violates).
233 See supranote 226 and accompanying text (noting that when a specific provision of
the Constitution applies, it, not substantive due process, governs adjudication of the case).
234 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
235 Id. at 395.
236 Id.
237 Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994).

1995]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTIONAD § 1983

903

specifically governs "pretrial deprivations of liberty" 238 failed to recognize that proceduraldue process is implicated by a § 1983 claim based
upon malicious prosecution.2 39 Hurtado recognized over 100 years
ago that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to operate
"according to the settled course of judicial proceedings,"2 40 and, applying a procedural due process analysis, the Court more recently "rejected the notion that all of the required incidents of a fundamentally
2 41
fair trial were to be found in the provisions of the Bill of Rights."
Therefore, while the plurality correctly concluded that the application
of the Fourth Amendment to petitioner's claim precludes substantive
due process review, it does not follow that application of the Fourth
Amendment to a § 1983 claim predicated on malicious prosecution
should also preclude due process analysis.2 42
Furthermore, the plurality noted that " [ t] he Framers considered
the matter of pretrialdeprivations of liberty, and drafted the Fourth
Amendment to address it." 243 However, not all § 1983 claims rest
upon a pretrial abuse of the legal process. 2 " Although petitioner's
case involved a claim under § 1983 based upon malicious prosecution
that occurred pretrial, 245 a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution may involve alleged abuse of the legal process during trial.246
Indeed, an element of any malicious prosecution claim requires that
238 Ironically, the Fourth Amendment can only be applied by the plurality to govern
petitioner's claim through incorporation of that amendment against the States via substantive due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
239 See Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1989) ("An abuse of process is by
definition a denial of procedural due process.") (quotingJennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d
1213, 1220 (3d Cir. 1977)). However, as noted, the Court was precluded from addressing a
possible procedural due process violation by petitioner's failure to present that issue in
petition for certiorari. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting that petitioner
presented only a substantive due process claim to the Supreme Court).
240 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533 (1884) (quoting Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90, 92-93 (1875)).
241 Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 n.6 (1994) (addressing the Court's holding in
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
242 To be sure, the plurality does not hold that procedural due process is not violated by
a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution, but merely fails to recognize that it may
be implicated in addition to the Fourth Amendment. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813-14. See also
Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Albrightwould appear virtually
to foreclose reliance on substantive due process as the basis for a viable malicious prosecution claim under section 1983") (emphasis added).
243 Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813 (emphasis added).
244 See, e.g., White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988) (case proceeded to trial and
plaintiff was convicted before perjury of investigative officer was discovered and § 1983
claim filed); Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs acquitted after jury
trial before § 1983 claim brought).
245 See supra notes 72 to 81 and accompanying text (noting that the charges against
plaintiff were dismissed prior to a jury trial).
246 See supra note 239.
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the underlying judicial proceeding ended in plaintiff's favor,24 7 with
no requirement that the proceeding end before trial. Therefore, it is
quite possible that a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution
could involve a deprivation of liberty during or even after trial and,
under the plurality's reasoning, the Fourth Amendment would not
dispositively preclude application of substantive due process to the
claim.

B.

2 48

ANALYSIS OF A FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: WAS PETITIONER
SEIZED?

Before Justice Ginsburg could analyze petitioner's claim under
the Fourth Amendment, 249 it was necessary to establish that petitioner
was "seized." There is no debate that an arrest of an individual by the
State is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. 250 However, it is
less obvious that the seizure continues despite a defendant's release
on bail.2 51 Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg adamantly argued that peti-

tioner was seized by the State until the criminal charges against him
were dismissed.252

Because Albright was seized, the facts of his case implicate the
Fourth Amendment. While the Court chose not to address this issue
because it was not before the Court,25 3 petitioner's failure to advance

the Fourth Amendment claim to the Court precluded the plurality
from providing guidance to the lower federal courts struggling with
the issue of whether a malicious prosecution claim is actionable under
§ 1983.254 Justice Ginsburg's concurrence provides the only
247 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing the requirements for common law
malicious prosecution claim).
248 Since a "specific constitutional guarantee" is required to preclude substantive due
process analysis, and the Fourth Amendment governs "pretrial deprivations of liberty," it is
unclear whether the Fourth Amendment, or any other constitutional provision, would preclude substantive due process analysis of a trial (or post-trial) deprivation of liberty. Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994).
249 Justice Ginsburg was the only justice to analyze petitioner's claim under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 814-17. As noted, the plurality correctly declined to address this issue.
See supra note 210.
250 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). ("[A]n arrest [is) . . . the
quintessential 'seizure of the person' under our Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence."). See
also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 451 (1981) (Stevens;J., dissenting) ("[E]very arrest
is a seizure of the person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.")
251 Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 815-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg speculates
that petitioner failed to advance a Fourth Amendment argument for fear of a narrow definition of the word seizure. Id. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
252 Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 815-16. See supra notes 117 to 128 and accompanying text.
253 Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813.
254 Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting the "embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion" on whether malicious prosecution violates the Constitution).
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C.

"OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS"

GOVERNS A FOURTH AMENDMENT

CLAIM

Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court must determine if the
police officer's seizure of petitioner pursuant to the evidence available
to him was "objectively reasonable." 256 Under this standard, an officer
violates the Fourth Amendment if the Court determines that the officer had "no reasonable grounds" for believing that a seizure was
57
legal.
Applying this standard to particular cases, the Court has announced that "searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any
deep inquiry into reasonableness." 25 8 An issued warrant becomes
prima facie evidence that an investigating officer acted reasonably in
conducting a search or seizure; "[o]nce the warrant issues, there is
literally nothing more that the policeman can do in seeking to comply
with the law."259 Therefore, "a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish" that an investigating officer has "acted in
good faith in conducting the search."2 60 Pursuant to this analysis, the
Court has declared "that in a doubtful or marginal case a search
under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would
fail."2 61
Nevertheless, a warrant may be invalidated (and thus the seizure
unconstitutional) because it was later determined that the information upon which the magistrate issued the warrant fell short of probable cause.2 62 A neutral magistrate's finding of probable cause,
implicit in the issuance of a search or arrest warrant, "does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on
which the determination was based."2 63 Therefore, when an arrest
warrant has been issued, the standard of "objective reasonableness"
requires that an individual show "knowing or reckless falsity of the
affidavit" before the seizure will be declared invalid, and the individ255 See supra note 249.
256 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding that a police officer's

seizure must be based upon objectively reasonable reliance of the evidence available).
257 Id. at 928.
258 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 266-67 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
259 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
260 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 (1982).
261 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
262 Gates,462 U.S. at 263 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
263 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978)).
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ual's constitutional rights deemed violated. 26 4 Once the court has determined that an individual was seized in violation of his Fourth
Amendment fights, that individual may use § 1983 as "a method for
265
vindicating [those] federal rights."
Assuming that petitioner had raised a Fourth Amendment claim,
the Court's first step would be to acknowledge that petitioner was arrested pursuant to the issuance of an arrest warrant.2 6 6 Therefore,
before the Court can conclude that petitioner's Fourth Amendment
fights were violated, the Court must conclude that there was ."knowing
or reckless falsity of the affidavit" submitted by Detective Oliver to the
2 67
neutral magistrate for issuance of the arrest warrant.
Petitioner did not allege that Detective Oliver presented any false
testimony to the magistrate or at the preliminary heafing. Therefore,
the seizure was not initiated pursuant to a "knowing... falsity of the
affidavit." 2 68 He merely failed to present all of the circumstances surrounding the arrest of petitioner for sale of a look-alike substance.2 69
However, petitioner did not allege that Detective Oliver's failure to
264 Id. If a warrant is declared invalid for lack of probable cause, the evidence obtained
pursuant to that seizure is excluded from being entered into evidence. This "exclusionary
rule" is designed to operate as "'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'" Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974)).
265 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). However, Justices Kennedy and
Stevens debate whether petitioner could seek relief under § 1983, because Illinois provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy. See supra notes 145 to 149, 193 to 196 and
accompanying text. The debate centers around whether the holding in Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981), applies to situations involving constitutional violations resulting from
random and unauthorized acts of state actors and what role the federal courts should play
in § 1983 claims where an adequate state postdeprivation remedy is available. The controversy surrounding the application of Parratthas continued. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517 (1984); Zinerman v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). However, analysis of the various
arguments is tangential to the discussion within this Note.
266 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Indeed, not only was petitioner arrested
(seized) pursuant to an arrest warrant, but probable cause to stand trial was also determined through a preliminary hearing. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. It is
unclear what effect this additional finding of probable cause should have on a court reviewing the objective reasonableness of the seizure. However, if both findings were predicated
upon one individual's testimony (through affidavit or otherwise), it seems logical that a
court should apply the test of "knowing or reckless falsity" to both determinations. See
Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.
267 Leon, 486 U.S. at 914. Presumably, if there was "knowing or reckless falsity" of the
testimony of Detective Oliver at the preliminary hearing, this would also constitute a violation of petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights. See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct 801, 816
(1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Oliver's testimony at the preliminary hearing, if deliberately misleading, violated the Fourth Amendment by perpetuating the seizure").
268 Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.
269 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (listing the various issues Detective Oliver
failed to relate at the preliminary hearing).
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present this information at this point in the criminal proceedings violated procedural due process under Illinois law.2 70 Therefore, even if
his testimony was "deliberately misleading,"2 7 ' petitioner must show
that Detective Oliver's reliance on the information that Ms. Moore
gave him made his testimony recklessly false.27 2 Where "It] he affidavit
related the results of an extensive investigation and... provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thouguhtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause," the seizure will
be deemed reasonable. 2 73 Under this rubric, each Justice must make
a factual determination whether Detective Oliver met this standard.
Given the decision in Albright, at least two Justices 274 would probably
have found that Detective Oliver did not meet this standard. Regardless, since the specific factual situation in Albright will not present itself
before the Court again, each § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution must be analyzed separately under the objective reasonableness standard to determine if an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Though the Court correctly held that petitioners must ground
their § 1983 claims in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, petitioner's failure to raise
the Fourth Amendment issue resulted in the Court's inability to definitively resolve whether malicious prosecution violates § 1983. Future
plaintiffs are guided only by the plurality's refusal to recognize a substantive due process claim andJustice Ginsburg's concurring opinion.
Therefore, it remains unclear whether a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution violates the Fourth Amendment or procedural due
process. Given the continued federal court inconsistency in the analysis of these claims, the Court will ultimately have to revisit the issue.
When the Court finally does analyze the issue under the Fourth

270 See supra note 211 (noting that petitioner only advanced a substantive due process
violation in his petition for certiorari).
271 Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
272 Leon, 486 U.S. at 914.
273 Id. at 926.

274 Justices Stevens and Blackmun, who both dissented in the case. Aibright, 114 S. Ct. at

822-35.
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Amendment, it will have to decide whether procedural safeguards already deemed constitutional by the Court as valid protections of
liberty are nevertheless subject to substantive review. Given the plurality in the Albright case, the answer to that question will most likely be
an emphatic "No."
ERIC J. WUNSCH

